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Abstract
This paper examines advisor choice decisions by publicly traded REITs and listed property
companies in Asia-Pacific real estate markets. Using a sample of 168 firms, we find robust
evidence that firms strategically evaluate and compare the increased agency costs associated
with external advisement against the potential benefits associated with collocating decision
rights with location specific soft information. Our empirical results reveal real estate companies
tend to hire external advisors when they invest in countries: 1) that are more economically and
politically unstable, 2) whose legal system is based on civil law, 3) where the level of corruption
is perceived to be high, and 4) when disclosure is relatively poor. Additionally, we find the
probability of retaining an external advisor is directly related to the expected agency costs.

Lastly, we find evidence of return premiums in excess of 13 % for firms whose organizational
structure matches their investment profile. As such, we conclude that the decision to hire an
external advisor represents a value relevant trade-off between the costs and benefits of this
organizational arrangement.
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Introduction
Conventional wisdom posits that externally advised real estate investment trusts (REITs) and
listed property companies significantly underperform their internally advised counterparts due
to the additional agency costs engendered by such organizational arrangements. This widely
held belief is based on two empirical observations: 1) since 1990 nearly 90 % of U.S. REITs
have been internally advised, and 2) early performance comparisons between internally and
externally advised REITs find evidence that externally advised REITs underperform.1 , 2
Additionally, the belief that the hiring of an external advisor increases agency costs is
consistent with Holmstrom (1999), who asserts that a firm will find it harder to extract effort
from an agent with a market contract than from an employee. With the conventional wisdom
suggesting that all REITs and listed property companies should be internally advised, we are
left to wonder why after 20 years of competition 10 % of U.S. REITs remain externally advised.
Furthermore, why are a substantially larger fraction of international REITs and listed property
companies externally advised?3 This paper provides an economic rationale for why some real
estate companies rationally choose external advisement.
A number of important findings within the literature suggests the need for this type of
examination. First, as noted above, extant theory is unable to explain the persistent survival of
the approximately 10 % of U.S. REITs that maintain external advisement. If external
advisement only increases agency costs without offering some offsetting benefit we would
expect externally advised REITs to be competed out of existence.4 Second, as the
international real estate markets have continued to evolve and expand over the past decade, it
has become readily apparent that the strong proclivity toward internal advisement appears to
be a uniquely U.S. phenomenon. Third, theoretical observations by Sun (2010) show that
contingent upon market conditions and viable contracting options, external advisement may
actually reduce agency problems via enhanced monitoring of individual portfolio advisors,
reputational capital effects, or efficiency gains.5 Fourth, a variety of recent studies suggest that
local investors possess value relevant soft information, which provides them with an advantage
when trading in local markets.6 To the extent external advisement allows REITs or similarly
structured real estate companies to capture this local knowledge, external advisement may
represent a relatively efficient form of organizational design for some firms. Consistent with this
notion, Cashman and Deli (2009) find that foreign mutual funds tend to locate portfolio
management with foreign advisors when investing in countries where local information is likely
to be more valuable.

Previewing our results, we find Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies are more
likely to hire an external advisor when they invest in countries: 1) that are more economically
and politically unstable, 2) whose legal system is based on civil law, 3) where the level of
corruption is perceived to be high, and 4) when disclosure is relatively poor. Additionally, we
find the probability of retaining an external advisor is directly related to the associated agency
costs. Finally, we find significant return premiums in excess of 13 % accruing to firms that have
an organizational structure consistent with their investment profile. Thus, we conclude the
decision to hire an external advisor represents a trade-off between the agency costs
associated with hiring an external advisor and the benefits associated with capturing local soft
information. Additionally, we argue that the external advisement decision should be viewed as
a strategic decision for the organization. These conclusions, while unique within the context of
the existing academic literature, are consistent with the views held by many international real
estate analysts and practitioners. For example, Austrade (2010) reports: “The use of internal or
external management of the property assets is also a strategic decision for AREIT managers.
Both methods are commonly used in the market with the key decision being cost efficiency and
local knowledge (p. 17).”
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. “Previous Literature” section outlines
relevant studies in both the existing real estate and mutual fund literatures which examine the
decision to outsource portfolio selection decisions. “Empirical Expectations” section motivates
our empirical hypotheses, while “Data and Sample Construction” section describes the sample
dataset and methodologies we employ to evaluate our core hypotheses. “Analysis” section
presents the details, results, and interpretations of our empirical analysis. Finally, “Conclusion”
section summarizes our key findings and concludes.

Previous Literature
The Role of Real Estate Advisors
REIT and real estate company advisors function much like a mutual fund advisor,
implementing the strategy determined by the sponsoring firm.7 Therefore, the advisor is
charged with a broad range of activities including property acquisition and disposition decisions
as well as identifying, hiring, and firing property managers and other related service providers,
in accordance with the sponsor’s desired strategy. Within Asia-Pacific markets, REITs and
other listed property companies typically specify an investment strategy at the time of fund
raising, and identify and retain the advisor after these decisions have been made. It is our
understanding that unlisted property companies within these same markets may well exhibit
considerably more variation in organizational design along this dimension, with advisor
selection helping to drive investment decisions for many of these private firms. To the extent
that advisor selection practices may differ across market segments, our results may not be
readily generalizable to the private market.
Prior to 1986, in the United States, REITs were statutorily prohibited from retaining in-house
advisory services. After the IRS private letter rulings of 1986 effectively opened the door to
alternative organizational arrangements for REIT advisement, the industry rapidly and
dramatically evolved to the extent that by 1990 nearly 90 % of REITs had elected to be

internally advised. This shift was widely viewed as an industry-wide attempt to avoid the
additional agency concerns engendered by external advisors.
Consistent with the notion that external advisement creates significant agency problems within
real estate markets, early empirical studies of U.S. REIT organizational design reported large
performance differences between internally and externally advised REITs. For example, Howe
and Shilling (1990) find internally advised REITs outperformed their externally advised
counterparts by 7 % during their sample period. Similarly, Capozza and Seguin (2000) find an
8 % disparity in their study, while Ambrose and Linneman (2001) suggest these differences
result from the significantly higher cost structures they document for externally advised REITs.8
Taken together, these results suggest external advisement engenders non-trivial agency costs
for U.S. REITs and listed property companies.
However, as noted above, the fraction of American REITs that retain external advisors has
remained relatively unchanged over the past 20 years. If internal advisement represents a
uniformly superior approach to organizational structure, then in a competitive marketplace
such as that faced by publicly traded real estate firms in the United States, these relatively
inefficient externally advised REITs should be competed out of existence. The continued
observation of this relatively stable fraction of the market anecdotally suggests some offsetting
benefit(s) must be associated with external advisement.
Turning our attention abroad, we note that international real estate markets do not exhibit the
same proclivity toward internal advisement observed in the U.S. REIT market. As illustrated in
Table 1, over 30 % of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies outsource their
advisement, with particularly high concentrations of firms doing so in Japan (77.1 %) and
Singapore (41.2 %). Even Australia (17.9 %) and Hong Kong (14.8 %) based real estate
companies exhibit external advisement rates well in excess of that observed in the United
States.9 The key question thus becomes, what benefit(s) does external advisement offer these
firms? We next turn to the mutual fund literature for key insights into this issue.
Table 1

External advisement rates by country
Incorporation
Headquarters
Exchange
Percent
Percent
Percent
Country
Real estate
Real estate
Real estate
externally
externally
externally
companies
companies
companies
advised
advised
advised
Australia 28
17.9 %
28
17.9 %
28
17.9 %
Hong
27
14.8 %
37
10.8 %
35
11.4 %
Kong
Japan
35
77.1 %
35
77.1 %
35
77.1 %
Singapore 34
41.2 %
35
40.0 %
37
37.8 %
Other
31
6.5 %
20
10.0 %
20
10.0 %
Total
155
33.5 %
155
33.5 %
155
33.5 %
This table provides information on the frequency with which Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies hire
external advisors to facilitate their portfolio selection and management decisions

Collocating Decision Rights: Monitoring Versus Information Acquisition
Cashman and Deli (2009) find that a mutual fund’s decision to hire a sub-advisor is driven by
the trade-off between the increase in the potential agency costs associated with hiring a subadvisor, and the costs associated with lost investment opportunities because the advisor lacks
value relevant soft information. Applying these findings to real estate markets, we argue that a
real estate company’s decision to hire an external advisor will also reflect this trade-off
between the costs of external advising and its associated benefits. Following Stein (2002), we
define soft information as any value relevant information that is difficult to transfer.
With respect to real estate, soft information acquisition may take a variety of forms. For
example, a boots-on-the-ground local presence engendered by external advisement may allow
the agents to more easily visit the property, physically inspect and assess its condition and
surrounding neighborhood, and directly interact with tenants and related stakeholders rather
than only reading about the property or gaining access to information through alternative
secondary sources.10 Additionally, as noted by Shen et al. (2012), international real estate
markets and property values remain heavily influenced by local cultures and customs. These
dimensions of investment value are typically not readily “accessible and transparent to outside
investors (p. 395).” As such, outsourcing advisement of investment decisions to firms with
superior knowledge of, or access to, value relevant dimensions of local customs and cultures
may well materially reduce the costs of due diligences, as both the time and money necessary
to satisfactorily complete information collection processes should be reduced.
Continuing, local agents (i.e., external advisors) with an established presence within a given
market may well have institutional knowledge of obscure, yet value relevant aspects of
individual property transactions, back stories, and counter-party risk. For example, suppose a
devout, Shariah compliant investor wishes to buy/sell a commercial property from/to an
international real estate firm. Local experts, such as external advisors, may well be more likely
to possess the relevant knowledge of this potential counter-party’s transaction history and
personal back story. Thus, local experts may be more successful at quickly and profitably
structuring a deal which complies with the unique demands and expectations of local
investors.11 Back story details or transaction histories may also be tremendously important with
respect to properties and locations as well as counterparties. Similarly, local market experts
may help alleviate the anchoring biases and high search costs which have been shown by
both Miller et al. (1988) and Lambson et al. (2004) to drive out-of-market buyers to materially
over-pay for residential real estate.12
Finally, given the highly localized nature of many real estate markets, local soft information
may be particularly value relevant to development activities within this market sector. For
example, location specific planning and zoning rules, appeal processes, and variances may
well be more transparent to local experts. Emerging building code trends with respect to green
building standards, growth corridors, impact fees and other socio-political trends may also be
more accessible and transparent to experienced local market participants. Together, these
examples illustrate only a small fraction of the myriad of potential mechanisms through which
local market insiders may obtain informational advantages over their more distant
counterparts.13

Consistent with the above view that locals possess soft information and our assertion that
external advisors are hired because of access to such local soft information, we identify the
geographic headquarters location of each of the external advisors retained by firms within our
sample. Of the 52 external advisors retained by sample firms, 51 are headquartered and have
a major physical presence in the country where the plurality or majority of the firm’s investment
properties are physically located.14 The lone exception is Starhill Global REIT, which is both
headquartered and listed in Singapore. They have retained the advisory services of YTL
Pacific Star REIT Management, also a Singapore based firm, to handle the implementation of
the firm’s investment strategy. Starhill holds a diversified portfolio of 13 retail and office
properties, currently valued at approximately S$2.7 billion ($2.1 billion U.S.), across five
countries—Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore. While the firm actually owns
more properties in Japan (seven) than any other country, the self-reported market value of
their Singapore holdings (two landmark properties on the world famous Orchard Road)
represents 68.3 % of their estimated total property portfolio value.15

Empirical Expectations
All else equal, we expect REITs and listed property companies will prefer internal advisors to
external advisors. As outlined by Chan et al. (2003), external advisors are less likely to focus
on maximizing shareholder wealth, thus internal advising is associated with lower agency costs
than external advising. Furthermore, we expect that when contracts are enforceable, thereby
reducing the agency costs associated with hiring an external advisor, real estate firms will be
more likely to retain an external advisor. Additionally, when the value of soft information is
greater, thereby increasing the benefits of collocating decision rights with local soft information,
we expect that firms will be more likely to have a local presence (i.e., hire an external advisor).
With this in mind, we argue the decision to hire an external advisor is driven by the trade-off
between the additional agency costs associated with external advisement, and the value of the
local soft information such arrangements allow the REIT, or listed property company, to
capture and utilize.
Throughout our analysis, we acknowledge that the agency costs associated with an external
advisor will vary based upon the unique profile of the countries in which the real estate
company invests. We proxy for the agency costs associated with external advising via the
Morck et al. (2000) governance index. This index represents a combination of several different
governance indices designed to measure the risk of: a) corruption, b) expropriation, and c)
repudiation within a given market. Higher values of the Morck, Yeung, and Yu index indicate a
better contracting environment. Specifically, we argue a better contracting environment lowers
the agency costs associated with hiring an external advisor, and further that this reduction in
agency costs should increase the likelihood that REITs and listed property companies will hire
an external advisor.16
After controlling for the agency costs associated with retaining an external advisor, we posit
that hiring an external advisor has the potential to align decision rights with value relevant soft
information. To investigate this hypothesis, we employ four alternative proxies for the value of
local soft information and the potential benefit of hiring an external advisor.

First, we assert that when a country is politically and/or economically unstable, the rapidly
changing nature of the market inherently dictates that the value of local soft information will be
higher, as the rapidly changing market implies opportunities will likely appear and disappear
quickly. Firms with access to local soft information should be better positioned to seize these
opportunities. As such, the corresponding value of lost investment opportunities for firms
without access to location specific soft information will be higher. To measure the political and
economic stability of each firm’s investment portfolio we use a portfolio weighted average of
the Euromoney country risk index.17 Specifically, for each firm contained within our sample we
identify the geographic (country) location of each property they hold within their investment
portfolio. The fraction of each firm’s portfolio invested in a given country is then multiplied by
the corresponding Euromoney country risk index value to estimate our firm specific political
and economic stability score. As property value estimates are often unavailable, country
weights are based upon the number of properties located within each jurisdiction.18 As higher
values for this index correspond to expectations of greater stability, we expect an inverse
relationship between our country stability index and the probability of external advisement.
Second, as secure and clearly defined property rights provide the foundation for investment
valuation, we also control for the origin of each country’s legal system. Djankov et al. (2003),
La Porta et al. (2004), and La Porta et al. (2008a, b) all note that judicial systems founded on
the underlying tenants of British common law are generally superior to judicial systems based
on (Roman and French) civil law with regards to protecting and securing property rights and
enforcing legal contracts. As such, countries with civil law based legal systems tend to have
larger unofficial economies. This implies that the value of missed opportunities from not
empowering agents possessing local soft information with decision rights will be larger in
countries where the legal system is based on the traditions of civil law. Therefore, we
anticipate REITs and other listed property companies will be more likely to employ external
advisors, who we expect to possess local soft information, as the fraction of their portfolio
invested in countries with civil law based legal systems increases. To examine this possibility,
for each firm we again create property weighted indices that are designed to measure the
percentage of each firm’s investment holdings subject to legal regimes built upon the
foundations of civil law. As we do not have access to market value information for all properties
contained within sample firm investment portfolios, our risk metrics are again property
weighted as opposed to value weighted. Based upon the arguments above, we expect a
positive relationship between our civil law index measure and the probability a firm retains
external advisement.
Third, we similarly note that when making real property investments it becomes critically
important to understand the intricacies of the local business, legislative, and regulatory
processes. In corrupt markets, external advisors with a physical presence become uniquely
important. Specifically, local knowledge of the idiosyncratic processes and potential pitfalls of
investing becomes increasingly important, as it potentially mitigates the possibilities for
expropriation. This implies that as the level of corruption increases, the value of the
opportunities lost by not collocating decision rights with the agent possessing the relevant local
soft information increases. In addressing this issue, we follow Cashman and Deli (2009) and
measure each firm’s exposure to corruption using a long-run average of the Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index (TICPI).19 Once again, each firm’s corruption value is

calculated using a property weighted investment portfolio average of the perceived corruption
index across the countries in which the firm holds investment assets. As higher values indicate
less corruption, we anticipate a negative relationship between each firm’s probability of
employing an external advisor and their investment portfolio’s average corruption index.
Fourth and finally, high quality disclosure can facilitate information transfer, which likely
reduces the value of local soft information. Conversely, low quality disclosure is likely to hinder
information transfer, thereby increasing the value of local soft information. As traditional
sources of information become less transparent, firms are forced to look for alternative sources
of information, which may include hiring external advisors. Following Jin and Myers (2006), we
proxy for the quality of disclosure using the Global Competitiveness Report.20 As with each of
our previous index metrics, the Global Competitiveness index score for each firm represents
their property weighted portfolio average. As higher values indicate more, or better, disclosure,
we anticipate the decision to employ an external advisor will be negatively related to our
disclosure index.

Data and Sample Construction
We begin our empirical analysis by identifying all REITs and listed property companies tracked
by SNL financial that trade on the Australian Stock Exchange, Bombay Stock Exchange, Hong
Kong Stock Exchange, New Zealand Exchange Limited, Singapore Exchange, or Tokyo Stock
Exchange.21 A complete list of the firms in our sample, organized by country of incorporation,
is provided in Appendix 1. We next identify the nature of each firm’s advising (internal versus
external). SNL determines whether the firms it covers are self-advised (internal) or not
(external). More specifically, SNL considers a firm to be self-advised if “the company provides
its own asset management services” or the firm shares common ownership with the advisor.
For example, consider the firm described in Fig. 1. ABC Real Estate Companies owns a
majority of XYZ Asset Management Co., and is also the parent company of both ABC Property
Management Inc. and ABC REIT. If ABC REIT hires XYZ Asset Management Co. to advise the
REIT, SNL would classify this organization as self (internally) advised, even though XYZ Asset
Management Co. is a separate legal entity, as the two organizations share common
ownership.

Fig. 1 The figure displays a sample organizational structure and how the firm would be classified in terms of
internal and external advisement

This classification scheme is also consistent with the prior literature. For example, Cashman
and Deli (2009) do not consider instances where the reported sub-advisor is owned by the
advisor or the two share a common owner to be indisputable evidence of the outsourcing of
decision rights. Specifically, they argue such scenarios are not “clear indications of the transfer
of portfolio decision rights from one party to another. Consequently, when [examining] the
allocation of decision rights to a sub-advisor, we are actually examining the allocation of
decision rights to an unaffiliated sub-advisor.” As such, following both the SNL classification
system and Cashman and Deli’s (2009) arguments, we only consider instances where advising
is provided by an unaffiliated third party as indicative of external advisement.22
Interestingly, some Asia-Pacific countries require REITs to be externally managed. To the
extent this regulatory paradigm extends into the asset management arena, it also suggests
that all REITs in those countries may well be externally advised.23 However, based upon SNL
classifications, this is clearly not the case. To the extent that effective firewalls separate the
REIT from a subsidiary or related advisor, we are potentially underreporting the frequency of
external advisement. This would likely bias us against finding empirical support for our focal
hypotheses. In unreported tests, we reclassify all sample REITs operating in such countries as
externally advised and find results consistent with those reported using the SNL classification.
Therefore, to be consistent with the prior literature, we employ the SNL classifications
throughout all our reported empirical specifications which follow.
Next we determine the geographic location (country) of every property held within each firm’s
investment portfolio. As outlined above, we then use these individual investment property
locations to estimate quantitative measures of each firm’s contracting environment (Morck
Governance Index) and their firm specific value of local soft information (Country Stability, Civil
Law Based Legal Origin, Corruption, and Disclosure). Specifically, for firms investing across
multiple jurisdictions, each organization’s: Morck Governance Index, Country Stability, Civil
Law Origin, Corruption, and Disclosure measures represent investment property portfolio
weighted country averages. As noted above, we expect external advisement to be more

prevalent in the presence of more enforceable contracts, and further, we expect firms to be
more likely to hire an external advisor when the value of local soft information is higher.
We complete the construction of our sample dataset by incorporating a number of control
variables relating to firm specific financial attributes and operating characteristics for each
sample real estate company. These data were obtained through the SNL financial database,
and a description of each variable is provided in Appendix 2. Table 2 provides descriptive
statistics for each of the variables employed throughout our empirical analysis. To highlight a
few key observations, we first note that roughly one-third of our sample companies (52 out of
155, or 33.5 %) are externally advised.24 This number is substantially higher than what is
observed in U.S. markets, and illustrates one key advantage of using the Asia-Pacific region to
examine our underlying hypotheses regarding the determinants of external advisement.
Continuing, we next observe that our contracting and information environment metrics all
exhibit substantial variation across firms. Moving on to firm characteristics, we find some firms
within our sample invest in properties located exclusively within a single country, while others
invest in properties in as many as 17 separate nations.25 , 26 Only 27 % of our sample firms
have formal analyst coverage, while less than 1 in 3 have publicly traded debt outstanding
which has been rated by Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, or DBRS. Somewhat surprisingly, given this
relatively limited following, only 6 % of sample firms are characterized by split bond ratings (at
the notch level). Both inside and institutional ownership levels also exhibit considerable
variation across firms, though both appear relatively modest compared to the levels observed
in their U.S. based counterparts.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable
Dependent variable
Externally advised
Contracting environment
Morck governance index
Soft information metrics
Country stability
Civil law origin
Corruption
Disclosure
Firm specific attributes
# of countries
Pureplay
Analyst coverage
Not rated
Split rating
Income focus
Stakeholders & insiders
Institutional ownership
Market capitalization

Obs.

Mean

Std. dev.

Minimum

Maximum

155

0.335

0.474

0

1

155

25.431

3.098

15.392

28.982

155
155
155
155

70.463
0.364
5.908
0.849

21.304
0.428
2.510
0.099

37.009
0
2.090
0.500

96.377
1
9.298
1

155
155
155
155
155
155
155
155
155

2.716
0.497
0.265
0.703
0.058
0.124
0.387
0.239
2,854.32

2.855
0.502
0.443
0.458
0.235
0.113
0.244
0.164
6,458.78

1
0
0
0
0
0.010
0.0001
0.002
0.053

17
1
1
1
1
0.920
0.926
0.772
47,286.4

Variable

Obs.
Mean
155
0.319
155
0.561

Std. dev.
0.159
0.498

Minimum

Maximum
0.984
1

Debt ratio
0
Development
0
Property type focus
Diversified/other
155
0.600
0.491
0
1
Retail
155
0.116
0.321
0
1
Office
155
0.116
0.321
0
1
Hotel/lodging
155
0.084
0.278
0
1
Industrial
155
0.045
0.208
0
1
Multi-family
155
0.039
0.194
0
1
This table provides descriptive statistics for all key variables employed throughout the empirical investigation.
Specifically, information regarding the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of each attribute
are reported. Note: market capitalization figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, using exchange rates as of the
record date of each firm’s financial statements

Turning to our financial attributes, the average firm in our sample has a market capitalization of
nearly $3 billion, though this number is highly skewed by a handful of very large, well
diversified Hong Kong based firms including Swire Pacific Limited, Sun Hung Kai Properties
Limited, and Cheung Kong Holdings Limited. The median firm within our sample exhibits a
much more modest market capitalization of approximately $700 million, a figure much more in
line with their U.S. based counterparts. Debt ratios for our sample of Asia-Pacific property
companies average slightly over 30 % of total assets, a figure substantively lower than the
50 % (or higher) values reported for many U.S. based REITs.27 Lastly, we note that 56 % of
the firms in our sample have an active property development program. Taken together, these
numbers seem quite reasonable and provide confidence that any empirical relationships we
observe are unlikely to be driven by data construction anomalies.

Analysis
Table 3 begins the empirical investigation by presenting the results of our univariate analysis
into which real estate companies hire an external advisor. The results presented in this table
are generally consistent with our a priori expectations. Specifically, we find externally advised
REITs and listed property companies tend to invest in countries with better contracting
environments, which is consistent with our expectation that as the contracting environment
improves the additional agency costs associated with retaining an external advisor are
diminished. Additionally, we find externally advised real estate companies tend to invest in
countries where the value of local soft information is greater, regardless of the proxy
employed. Taken together, these univariate findings offer strong preliminary support for our
focal propositions.

Table 3 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests
Variable

Internally advised
Obs.
Mean

Externally advised
Obs.
Mean

Satterthwaite T-test of differences

Contracting environment
Morck governance index 103
24.58
52
27.12
−6.55***
Soft information metrics
Country stability
103
77.78
52
55.96
6.17***
Civil law origin
103
0.24
52
0.61
−5.61***
Corruption
103
6.69
52
4.37
5.37***
Disclosure
103
0.88
52
0.79
5.25***
Firm specific attributes
# of countries
103
3.14
52
1.88
3.03***
Pureplay
103
0.40
52
0.69
−3.64***
Analyst coverage
103
0.22
52
0.35
−1.57
Not rated
103
0.82
52
0.48
4.19***
Split rating
103
0.06
52
0.06
0.01
Income focus
103
0.15
52
0.07
6.08***
Stakeholders & insiders
103
0.46
52
0.24
6.71***
Institutional ownership
103
0.21
52
0.30
−3.59***
Market capitalization
103
3,983.7
52
617.3
4.38***
Debt ratio
103
0.29
52
0.37
−3.23***
Development
103
0.64
52
0.40
2.86**
This table provides mean values and univariate tests of differences in means for all key variables employed
throughout the empirical investigation disaggregated by the firm’s organizational design. Note: market
capitalization figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, using exchange rates as of the record date of each firm’s
financial statements

A close examination of Table 3 further reveals that internally advised property trusts tend to
invest in more countries than their externally advised counterparts. This is entirely consistent
with our expectation that the value of an external advisor decreases with the number of
countries in which the firm invests. Continuing, internally advised firms also exhibit higher
insider ownership than externally advised trusts. This is also not surprising, as one key benefit
of inside ownership is that it helps align insider incentives with those of the investors. With an
externally advised property company, the need to align the firm’s insiders’ incentives with
those of investors is clearly mitigated. Additionally, we also note that institutional ownership is
higher for externally advised REITs and listed property companies than for their internally
advised peers. This finding is consistent with the notion that institutions serve an important
function as monitors, and thereby reduce the potential agency costs associated with employing
an external advisor.
While univariate measures often provide a meaningful glimpse into underlying economic
relations, a broader, more robust understanding of these linkages generally requires a
multivariate context. As such, we next continue our analysis by estimating Logistic regressions
of the following general form to assess the validity of our key, focal hypotheses:

•

External Advisement = f (Contracting Environment, Information Gains, Firm
Characteristics, ε).

The results of these base-case regressions, estimated exclusively over the subset of sample
firms electing REIT status, are presented in Table 4. We begin by exclusively examining the
REIT subsample to mitigate any potential identification bias issues associated with a real
estate firm’s choice of REIT status. As will be demonstrated throughout the subsequent
empirical analysis, our core, focal results are generally robust to the inclusion of non-REIT
listed real estate companies. When interpreting the results, we also note that the intercept term
represents the probability that a benchmark firm hires an external advisor. By construction, the
benchmark firm in our sample dataset has all continuous variables set to their respective mean
values, and all indicator variables set equal to zero. The reported coefficients reflect the
change in the probability that the benchmark firm hires an external advisor given a one
standard deviation increase (from its mean) in a continuous variable, or an indicator variable
switches from zero to one. The primary variables of interest in this analysis are our measure of
the cost associated with hiring an external advisor (Morck Governance Index) and our four
measures of the value of local soft information.
Table 4 Determinants of external advisement for Asia-Pacific real estate companies
Variables
Intercept
Contracting environment

0.902

(1)
0.632

(2)
0.844

(3)
0.409

(4)

Morck governance index

0.082**
(4.89)

0.332**
(5.21)

0.133**
(4.79)

0.479**
(4.58)

Soft information metrics
Country stability

−0.673**
(4.42)
0.351*

Civil law origins

(3.70)
−0.621**

Corruption

(4.59)
0.072

Disclosure

(0.18)

Firm specific attributes
# of countries
Pureplay
Analyst coverage
Not rated
Split rating

0.015
(0.02)
0.058
(0.15)
0.010
(0.01)
−0.888*
(3.20)
−0.902**

−0.082
(0.05)
0.330
(1.33)
−0.455
(1.05)
−0.632*
(3.53)
−0.632*

0.052
(0.08)
0.073
(0.10)
0.008
(0.01)
−0.840*
(3.71)
−0.844**

−0.075
(0.17)
0.475
(1.67)
−0.284
(0.95)
−0.409**
(4.86)
−0.409**

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(4.00)
(3.15)
(3.96)
(4.35)
−0.170
−0.361*
−0.207
−0.305**
Income focus
(1.87)
(3.34)
(1.73)
(4.49)
−0.008
−0.061
−0.046
−0.171
Stakeholders & insiders
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.67)
−0.255
−0.459
−0.396
−0.292
Institutional ownership
(0.98)
(1.18)
(1.32)
(1.51)
−0.370
−0.410
−0.585
−0.395*
Market capitalization
(0.79)
(0.80)
(1.44)
(3.54)
−0.560**
−0.578***
−0.616***
−0.383**
Debt ratio
(4.66)
(6.79)
(7.33)
(5.63)
0.079
0.316
0.124
0.475
Development
(0.76)
(1.53)
(0.94)
(2.46)
Property type controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
75
75
75
75
Psuedo-R2
0.6068
0.6013
0.5949
0.5454
This table presents the results of four logistic regressions investigating the reasons why Asia-Pacific REITs
choose to retain external advisors. Each model regresses the firm’s choice of organizational form (externally
advised equals one, zero otherwise) against measures of the benefits associated with collocating portfolio
decision rights with location specific soft information, the contracting environment faced by the firm, and an array
of firm specific control variables. Specifically, soft information benefits are measured using our investment
portfolio weighted Country Stability Index in Model (1), exposure to judicial systems originating from the tenants of
Civil Law in Model (2), Corruption Perceptions Index in Model (3), and Clarity of Disclosure Index in Model (4)
*** Indicates statistical significance at 1 % level, ** Indicates statistical significance at 5 % level, * Indicates
statistical significance at 10 % level

Examining the results in Table 4, we first note the consistently significant positive relation
between our Morck Governance Index and the likelihood a sample REIT retains an external
advisor. Across the four models, the coefficients range from 0.082 to 0.479 and suggest a one
standard deviation improvement in the relevant contracting environment of the firm’s
investments increases the firm’s probability of retaining an external advisor by 9.1–117 %.28
This result is entirely consistent with our a priori expectations outlined above, and the
theoretical forcing contracts argument developed by Sun (2010).
Continuing on to our soft information measures, in model 1 we see that as the political and
economic stability of the countries in which the REIT holds investment assets increases, the
firm is less likely to hire an external advisor. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in
country stability reduces the probability that the firm hires an external advisor by 74.6 %.29 In
model 2, we observe that the relation between investing in countries with legal systems based
on civil law and the use of an external advisor is both directionally consistent with our
expectations and (marginally) statistically significant. In terms of economic import, a one
standard deviation increase in our Civil Law Origins information metric is associated with a
55.5 % increase in the probability that the firm will retain an external advisor. Continuing on to
model 3, we next observe that as the REIT invests in less corrupt countries, the firm is less
likely to hire an external advisor. A one standard deviation increase in the corruption index,
which corresponds to a reduction in the average level of perceived corruption, reduces the

probability that the firm hires an external advisor by 73.6 %. Finally, in model 4 while our
disclosure metric exhibits an unexpected positive sign, the coefficient estimate is not
statistically significant. As such, we offer no additional commentary on this result.
Taken together, these results provide relatively strong and robust support for the contention
that a REIT’s decision to hire an external advisor is driven by the trade-off between the
additional agency costs engendered by this organizational structure and the value of local soft
information the external advisor may possess or acquire. As such, these results provide
evidence of a potential offsetting benefit to the long recognized increased agency costs
associated with retaining an external advisor, and further, provide a rationale and justification
for the continued existence of, and international proclivity towards, external advisement for
REITs.

Robustness
To this point in the analysis we have focused exclusively on REITs. Thus, to generalize our
results across broader commercial real estate markets requires the implicit assumption that all
real estate firms respond to the trade-off between potential agency costs and information gains
in an equivalent manner. More specifically, we have implicitly ignored both operational and
regulatory differences between REITs and those listed real estate companies which have not
(or cannot) elected REIT status. For example, in many Asian countries listed property
companies operate primarily as real estate development companies, while REITs may be
legally limited in their exposure to such activities.30 Additionally, we have lumped internally
advised firms which perform their own valuations together with those firms which are internally
advised but outsource specific functions which materially influence investment decisions to
third parties. Table 5 investigates the robustness of our core results by re-estimating our base
model regressions across four alternative data specifications. Specifically, in Panel A we first
broaden our sample to include not only REITs, but also listed property companies from across
the Asia-Pacific region that are either unable, or unwilling, to elect REIT status. This
specification offers the potential for increased estimation power, as well as additional insight
into the broader generalizability of our results. Reassuringly, our core findings are qualitatively
robust to the inclusion of non-REIT, real estate firms. More specifically, across all four model
specifications in Panel A, and consistent with both expectations and our previously reported
REIT specific results, our Morck Governance Index (Contracting Environment Metric)
continues to be significantly positively related to the probability of external advisement for AsiaPacific real estate firms. Similarly, in Models 1–3 our soft information metrics continue to retain
their expected (and previously reported) signs, though our legal foundations metric is no longer
statistically significant. On the other hand, in Model 4 our disclosure metric now exhibits a
statistically significant (and expected) negative sign, suggesting either the enhanced power
attributable to the additional observations allows us to now statistically identify our
hypothesized relationship, or alternatively that REITs and listed property companies are
differentially sensitive to the opacity of firm disclosures.

Table 5 Determinants of external advisement: robustness analysis
(1)
(2)
Panel A: REIT and non-REIT, choice of external advisement
Contracting environment
0.198***
0.089***
Morck governance index
(8.16)
(8.17)
Soft information metrics
−0.414*
Country stability
(2.80)
Civil law origins

(3)

0.191***
(8.51)

(0.71)
−0.438*
(3.17)
−0.299*

Disclosure
Headquarters controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Property type controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
155
155
155
2
Psuedo-R
0.8714
0.8631
0.8722
Panel B: REIT and non-REIT, Choice of external advisement (Broad definition)
Contracting environment
0.219**
0.194**
0.216**
Morck governance index
(4.17)
(6.10)
(3.90)
Soft information metrics
−0.335**
Country stability
(3.88)

Corruption

0.324***
(9.00)

0.052

Corruption

Civil law origins

(4)

(3.17)
Yes
Yes
155
0.8748

0.247**
(4.19)

0.187**
(4.52)
−0.195
(1.30)

−0.127
(1.74)
Headquarters controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Property type controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
155
155
155
155
2
Psuedo-R
0.6219
0.6251
0.6090
0.6129
Panel C: non-development subsample, choice of external advisement (Broad definition)
Contracting environment
Morck governance index
0.207*
0.211*
0.315*
0.341**
Disclosure

(1)
(3.65)

(2)
(3.63)

(3)
(3.60)

(4)
(4.73)

Soft information metrics
Country stability

−0.272
(0.80)
0.220

Civil law origins

(1.95)
−0.015
(0.01)

Corruption

−0.167

Disclosure
Headquarters controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Property type controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
68
68
68
2
Psuedo-R
0.7563
0.7720
0.7485
Panel D: development subsample, choice of external advisement (Broad definition)
Contracting environment
0.042
0.011**
0.566
Morck governance index
(0.62)
(4.00)
(2.50)
Soft information metrics
−0.021**
Country stability
(5.87)

0.131
(2.18)

0.011**
(5.03)

Civil law origins

−0.187**

Corruption

(4.61)

Disclosure
Headquarters controls
Property type controls
Observations
Psuedo-R2

(1.46)
Yes
Yes
68
0.7626

Yes
Yes
87
0.7351

Yes
Yes
87
0.6616

Yes
Yes
87
0.7144

−0.625**
(4.18)
Yes
Yes
87
0.6847

This table presents the results of logistic regressions investigating the reasons why Asia-Pacific REITs and listed
property companies choose to retain external advisors (Panel A). Panels B-D examine the decision to retain
external advisement and/or independent third-party property appraisers. Each model regresses the firm’s advisory
choice against measures of the benefits associated with collocating portfolio decision rights with location specific
soft information, the contracting environment faced by the firm, and an array of firm specific control variables.
Specifically, soft information benefits are measured using our investment portfolio weighted Country Stability
Index in Model (1), exposure to judicial systems originating from the foundational tenants of Civil Law in Model
(2), Corruption Perceptions Index in Model (3), and Clarity of Disclosure Index in Model (4)
*** Indicates statistical significance at 1 % level, ** Indicates statistical significance at 5 % level, * Indicates
statistical significance at 10 % level

Continuing to Panel B, we next expand our definition of externally advised firms to include both
those organizations which have explicitly retained external advisory firms as well as those who
have retained the ongoing services of third party professional appraisal firms to assist with
their valuation of investment properties. These appraisal firms, which typically are not directly
responsible for making individual investment property decisions, do materially influence the
process through their valuations. As such, a foreign firm which hires a local appraisal company
may well be able to capture value relevant soft information we have previously attributed
exclusively to external advisors.31 Information on the retention of such property appraisal
professional firms is obtained directly from the SNL Financial database. This alternative
definition increases the frequency of externally advised sample firms (both REITs and nonREIT listed property companies) from 52 of 155 (33.5 %) as reported in Table 2, to 87 of 155
(56.1 %). Once again, our focal results are qualitatively robust to the selection of either
dependent variable definition. More specifically, our contracting environment metric continues
to be significantly positively related to the probability of retaining an external advisor, while all
four soft information metrics once again exhibit their hypothesized sign. Interestingly, two of
these four soft information metrics (Country Stability and Civil Law Origins) exhibit enhanced
statistical significance under this broader external advisement definition, while the other two
(Corruption and Disclosure) are now marginally insignificant. Nonetheless, we view these
results as being generally consistent with the notion that a firm’s contracting environment and
information environment both materially influence its optimal organizational design.
Continuing with our robustness analysis, panel C of Table 5 presents results focused
exclusively on those REITs and listed property companies which do not have active property
development programs and/or pipelines in place. For these firms, their primary source of
income depends critically on their ability to collect and/or monetize cashflows from financial
contracts. As such, the enforceability of such legal instruments should be of particular
importance, and thus, we would expect the organizational structure of these firms to be
uniquely responsive to the contracting environments of the local market area(s) in which they
invest. Consistent with these expectations, we find organizational choice decisions for these
non-development firms to be significantly related to our Morck Governance Index metric.
Specifically, our results suggest that as the contracting environment faced by a REIT or listed
real estate company improves (i.e., contracts become more enforceable), the agency costs
associated with hiring an external advisor decline, and thus the probability of outsourcing
advisement increases.
Conversely, panel D of Table 5 examines those REITs and listed property companies with an
active, ongoing development program or pipeline. For this subset of firms, we expect access to
local, soft information to be uniquely important in facilitating the identification and development
of real property investment opportunities, substantively increasing the value of soft information.
Consistent with this notion, all four soft information proxies are statistically significant and
suggest both REITs and listed property companies are more likely to retain external
advisement when the value of local, soft information increases.

Given the findings presented throughout Table 5, a legitimate question arises as to the
endogeneity of firm choice of REIT status, development activities, and the external advisement
decision. To further explore this issue, Table 6 once again re-estimates our base case, logistic
advisor choice regressions, this time employing the Cashman and Deli (2009) framework for
mitigating endogeneity concerns. Specifically, much like two (Panel A), or three (Panel B),
stage least squares (2SLS/3SLS), preliminary logistic regressions explaining firm decisions to
elect REIT status, and then separately to participate in development activities, are estimated.
Predicted values from these preliminary regressions are then included in the advisory choice
models as additional independent variables to help orthogonalize the parameters of interest.
Table 6 Determinants of external advisement: endogeneity controls
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: 2SLS
Intercept
Contracting environment

0.739

0.779

0.688

0.837

Morck governance index

0.144*
(3.35)

0.134**
(3.84)

0.167*
(3.04)

0.154***
(7.24)

Soft information metrics
Country stability

−0.364**
(5.33)
0.141**

Civil law origins

(5.10)
−0.235

Corruption

(2.23)
−0.512**

Disclosure

(6.29)

Firm specific attributes
Predicted REIT
Headquarters controls
Property type controls
Observations
Psuedo-R2
Panel B: 3SLS
Intercept
Contracting environment
Morck governance index

−0.064
(0.19)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6227

0.048
(0.20)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6260

−0.057
(0.11)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6095

−0.655*
(4.72)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6355

0.629

0.848

0.682

0.882

0.180a
(2.68)

0.093b
(2.56)

0.175*
(2.93)

0.112***
(7.13)

Soft information metrics
Country stability

−0.384**
(5.31)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.127**
(5.99)

Civil law origins

−0.236

Corruption

(2.30)
−0.490**
(6.20)

Disclosure
Firm specific attributes
Predicted dev.
Predicted REIT
Headquarters controls
Property type controls
Observations
Psuedo-R2

−0.074
(0.21)
−0.152
(0.39)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6237

−0.219
(1.63)
−0.097
(0.36)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6339

0.027
(0.04)
−0.032
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6097

−0.029
(0.13)
−0.693**
(4.07)
Yes
Yes
155
0.6361

This table presents the results of logistic regressions investigating the reasons why Asia-Pacific REITs and listed
property companies choose to retain external advisors and/or independent third-party property appraisers. Panel
A presents a 2SLS model, which controls for the predicted probability that the fund chooses REIT status. Panel B
presents a 3SLS model controlling for both the predicted probability that the fund chooses REIT status, and the
predicted probability that the fund engages in development activities. Each model regresses the firm’s advisory
choice against measures of the benefits associated with collocating portfolio decision rights with location specific
soft information, the contracting environment faced by the firm, and an array of firm specific control variables.
Specifically, soft information benefits are measured using our investment portfolio weighted Country Stability
Index in Model (1), exposure to judicial systems originating from the foundational tenants of Civil Law in Model
(2), Corruption Perceptions Index in Model (3), and Clarity of Disclosure Index in Model (4)
*** Indicates statistical significance at 1 % level, ** Indicates statistical significance at 5 % level, * Indicates
statistical significance at 10 % level. a represents a p-value of 0.102. b represents a p-value of 0.109

Examining these results, we once again find the firm’s contracting environment to be
significantly related to the probability a firm outsources their advisement, with more
enforceable contracts increasing a firm’s willingness to retain external advisors.32 Similarly, our
four soft information proxies all retain their expected signs across both panels, with our country
stability, legal foundation, and disclosure metrics all exhibiting enhanced significance relative
to our results presented in Table 4.33 Taken together, we view Tables 5 and 6 results as
indicative that REITs and listed property companies may well face different regulatory
environments and operating constraints. However, the underlying agency cost versus
information acquisition trade-off paradigm which drives the advisor choice decision is robust
across both REIT versus non-REIT organizations and development versus non-development
firms.
Consequences of Advisor Choice
Finally, in Table 7 we examine the outcomes associated with the advisor choice decision.
Given the international nature of our sample, it becomes difficult to specify a traditional multifactor model such as Fama and French (1993) or Carhart (1997). As such, following Dempsey

et al. (2012) we model a real estate company’s expected return as a function of its operating
characteristics, and include fixed-effect controls for year and country of origin.34 The time and
location fixed effects effectively control for market wide returns, while the firm characteristics
control for potential systematic differences in return patterns across divergent firm profiles such
as size and income focus. Abnormal returns are measured as the residual from this expected
return regression. In Panel A, we show that our sample companies are not able to earn
abnormal returns, and provide descriptive statistics associated with firm performance.
Table 7 Performance differences across observable firm organizational characteristics
Panel A: abnormal return characteristics of sample REITs and listed property companies
Mean Median
Max Min
Abnormal
0.000 0.011
1.353 −1.731
return
Panel B: operating versus development firms
Satterthwaite T-test of
Obs. Development
Obs. Operating
Difference
Abnormal
67
−0.014
85
0.011
−0.40
return
Panel C: NonREIT versus REIT firms
Satterthwaite T-test of
Obs. REIT
Obs. NonREIT
Difference
Abnormal
78
0.017
74
−0.018
0.56
return
Panel D: internally versus externally advised firms
Satterthwaite T-test of
Obs. Externally Advised
Obs. Internally Advised
Difference
Abnormal
101 0.019
51
−0.038
1.04
return
Panel E: predicted to be internally versus externally advised firms
Expected Internally
Expected Externally
Satterthwaite T-test of
Obs.
Obs.
Advised
Advised
Difference
Abnormal
103 0.017
49
−0.036
0.95
return
Panel F: matched versus non-matched organizational form and investment profile
Satterthwaite T-test of
Obs. Matched
Obs. Not Matched
Difference
Abnormal
8
−0.130
144 0.007
−1.85*
return
This table provides performance comparisons of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies across
organizational characteristics. In panel A, we provide basic characteristics of our expected return model
estimation. In panel B, we examine return differences between operating and development firms. Panel C
examines the return differences between Non-REIT real estate firms and REITs. In panel D, we examine return
differences between internally and externally advised real estate companies. Panel E examines the return
difference between those firms we predict should be externally advised, and those we predict should be advised

internally. Finally, in panel F, we examine return differences between firms whose organizational form matches
their investment profile and those which do not

Throughout this paper we argue that the decision to hire an external advisor represents a
trade-off between the additional agency costs associated with an external advisor and the
value of capturing local soft information. We also note that in a competitive market, competition
should weed out firms that make relatively inefficient operating decisions, including those
related to the selection of organizational design. As such, we expect that REITs and listed
property companies will tend to organize themselves in a relatively efficient manner. Therefore,
if firms are indeed making appropriate decisions with regard to organizational design there
should be no observable differences in performance based upon participation in development
activities, REIT status, or type of advisor employed by the firm. In Panels B-E we test for such
performance differences across observable firm organizational characteristics. Examining the
results, we are unable to detect a statistically significant difference between the performance of
real estate operating versus real estate development firms, REITs versus other listed real
estate companies, or internally advised REITs and listed real estate companies versus their
externally advised peers (on either a realized or predicted basis). While these results could be
due to a lack of power in our tests, or limitations with our expected returns model, they are also
consistent with our central hypothesis that firms are choosing their organizational structures in
a relatively efficient manner.
Finally, we also examine the predictive power of our model. If we are correct that the decision
to hire an external advisor is a significant, value relevant decision for the firm, and furthermore
that our model accurately predicts the appropriate organizational form based upon the agency
cost versus information acquisition trade-off facing each firm, then we would expect firms
acting in accordance with our predictions to outperform firms that do not. To examine this
notion that firms which select the “correct” organization form outperform those which do not,
we first classify all firms in our sample as being either matched or non-matched. A matched
firm is one whose organizational structure is consistent with empirical expectations.
Specifically, we average each firm’s likelihood of retaining an external advisor using
predictions from all four regression models contained in Table 5 Panel A. If the average
probability of hiring an external advisor is greater than 50 % and the firm is indeed externally
advised, it is consider to be correctly advised (matched). If the average probability of hiring an
external advisor is less than 50 % and the firm is internally advised, it is also considered to be
correctly advised (matched). Firms that are externally advised and have an average probability
of external advisement less than 50 %, or those that are internally advised and have an
average probability of external advisement greater than 50 %, are considered to be incorrectly
advised (non-matched).
Using this methodology, we find only 8 firms in our sample are not correctly advised.35 This
result illustrates the strong predictive power of our advisor choice models, as we are able to
correctly classify approximately 95 % of our sample observations. Furthermore, we find
significant underperformance associated with these 8 “non-matched” firms. Specifically, they
provide abnormal returns 13 % below expectations, while our “matched” firms outperform
expectations by 0.7 %. In sum, these findings demonstrate that the advisory choice decision
has significant implications for the firm. Furthermore, these results are consistent with our
modeling of the decision to hire an external advisor as a trade-off between the increased

agency costs of such structures and the value of the local soft information the external advisor
possesses or allows the firm to capture.

Conclusion
In this paper we explore decisions by Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies to hire
an external advisor. To date, this decision has received relatively scant attention in the
academic literature, primarily because conventional wisdom posits that all such property
companies should be internally advised due to the increased agency costs associated with
retaining an external advisor. Consistent with this wisdom, we find that firms choose not to hire
an external advisor when the agency costs associated with doing so are relatively high.
However, contrary to conventional wisdom, we also find robust evidence that hiring an external
advisor can be beneficial, allowing the real estate company to access and act on local soft
information, thereby enhancing its performance.
Specifically, we find that the probability of retaining an external advisor is positively related to
our Morck Governance Index, suggesting such arrangements are more likely when contracts
are more easily enforceable. Furthermore, after controlling for the contracting environment, we
find REITs and listed property companies are more likely to hire an external advisor when: 1)
political and economic instability increases, 2) they invest more heavily in countries with legal
systems rooted in the traditions of civil law, 3) they invest in locations characterized by high
perceptions of corruption, and 4) they invest in countries requiring relatively limited or opaque
corporate disclosures. Finally, we also present evidence that firms which appropriately align
their organizational structures to balance the trade-off between agency costs and the soft
information benefits associated with external advisement are rewarded in the marketplace with
higher returns.
In summary, we find the external advisement decision is more complex than is typically
recognized by the existing literature. Specifically, hiring an external advisor may well be a
relatively efficient organizational design choice for many Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property
companies, particularly those investing in market sectors where the value of local soft
information is higher. Thus, the internal versus external advisor choice decision by Asia-Pacific
REITs and listed property companies should be viewed as a value relevant, strategic decision
for the firm.

Footnotes
1 In 1986, the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued private-letter rulings which first
authorized internal advisement of REITs. After these rulings, the vast majority of existing REITs
converted to internal advising, while most newly formed enterprises likewise organized
themselves in this fashion.
2 See, for example, Howe and Shilling (1990), Capozza and Seguin (2000), and Ambrose and
Linneman (2001).
3 See Chan et al. (2003) for historical data on internal advisement frequencies. As to current data, a
cursory review of North American real estate companies tracked by SNL financial reveals only
19 of 171 (or 11.1 %) covered REITs and 3 of 34 (or 8.8 %) covered non-REIT real estate
operating companies are currently externally advised—data as of February 22, 2011. The use of

Asia-Pacific markets provides the dual benefit of both increased variation in the organizational
design of sample firms and allows us to use country based measures of soft information:
country stability, legal environment, corruption, and disclosure.
4
See, for example, Alchian (1950).
5 Sun (2010) observes that external advisement could lead to heterogeneous productivity, but argues
the direct causes of such productivity differences are not obvious. This paper examines several
potential sources of such productivity advantages.
6 See, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), and Cashman and Deli (2009).
7 See Chan et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion of the role of REIT advisors.
8 Additional related studies examining REIT performance across alternative organizational forms
include Cannon and Vogt (1995), who find self-administered REITs outperform their advisor-run
REIT counterparts, and Wei et al. (2001), who find captive REITs exhibit higher costs of capital
than their non-captive counterparts.
9 We note that only 11 firms in our sample choose to incorporate, are headquartered, and list their
shares in different geographic markets. These firms are: Asia Standard International Group
Limited, Century City International Holdings Limited, Far East Consortium International Limited,
Great Eagle Holdings Limited, Guocco Leisure Limited, HKR International Limited, Hongkong
Land Holdings Limited, Mandarin Oriental International Limited, Paliburg Holdings Limited,
Regal Hotels International Holdings Limited, and Shangri-La Asia Limited.
10 This example is similar to Chen et al. (2010) example of soft information in the mutual fund industry.
They contend the ability to talk to a firm’s CEO versus only reading the firm’s financial reports
provides locally based mutual funds with value relevant soft information.
11 See, for example, Lin and Yung (2006), Girard and Hassan (2008), Ibrahim and Ong (2008), and
Ibrahim et al. (2009) for further information and details on Shariah compliance and Islamic
investment in real estate.
12 We do note that both Myer et al. (1992) and Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) fail to find evidence of
price premiums paid by out-of-market buyers.
13 Empirical evidence that local market investors have access to superior information may also be
found in Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), Dvorrak (2005), Choe et al. (2005), and Ivkovic and
Weisbenner (2005).
14 By contrast, only 75 % of sample firms are incorporated in the country in which they most heavily
invest.
15 See www.starhillglobalreit.com.
16 Our following empirical results are robust to the selection of alternative agency cost indices such as
those suggested by La Porta et al. (2008a, b).
17 See http://www.euromoney.com/poll/10683/PollsAndAwards/Country-Risk.html for complete details
on the construction and limitations of this index. We mitigate the influence of annual deviations
in the index by averaging each country’s score over the preceding decade.
18 One could reasonable expect that both the agency costs and the value of soft information in the
country where the real estate firm is located may impact the decision to hire an external advisor.
We argue that while the contracting environment where the firm is located could potentially be
as important as where the properties are located, the value of soft information would be less
important. The firm would want to be sure that the contract is enforceable on both ends, while
the value of soft information is location specific and only valuable where the firm is investing. In
untabulated tests we find results consistent with these arguments. Specifically, when using
agency cost and soft information metrics based solely upon the headquarters location, country
of incorporation, or trading venue of each firm rather than our portfolio weighted metrics, the
Morck et al. (2000) governance index results are consistent with our reported findings, while our
soft information proxies are not statistically significant.
19 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 for complete details on
the construction and limitations of this index.

20 See http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf for complete
details on the construction and limitations of this index.
21 We start with a sample of 198 real estate firms followed by SNL, but then lose 43 observations
because of data limitations. Specifically, we lose 15 observations because of missing ownership
data, 6 observations due to missing debt ratios, and 22 observations because of missing soft
information proxies.
22 We readily cede the notion that our classification system will potentially under (over) identify
externally (internally) advised organizations. We do not view this as overly problematic, as any
systematic misspecification along this dimension should bias us against finding empirical
support for our focal hypotheses.
23 See Luo (2008), Tan (2009), and Brounen and Koning (2012) for additional detail and insight into
cross-country variation in REIT regulations across the Asia-Pacific region.
24 We acknowledge that firms operating in multiple markets and/or countries may rationally choose to
retain multiple external advisors. We do not view this as a major issue with this analysis as the
economics underlying the decision to hire multiple external advisors should be similar to those
underlying the basic outsourcing decision.
25 Note, the median firm in our sample invests in only 2 countries, while City Developments Limited
invests across 17 different nations. Furthermore, our contracting environment and soft
information metrics, which become increasingly computationally intensive as the number of
countries increase, are designed to implicitly capture many important aspects of the
international diversification of each firm’s investment holdings. Nonetheless, given the wealth of
existing literature suggesting that geographic proximity may well influence firm level decisionmaking and performance, we feel it is also important to explicitly control for the number of
countries (jurisdictions) across which an individual firm invests. See, for example, Coval and
Moskowitz (1999), Choe et al. (2005), Dvorrak (2005), and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) for
additional insight into international diversification, geographic proximity, and firm performance.
26 One may reasonably expect that property sector strategies may materially influence the geographic
diversification patterns of many real estate firms’ investment holdings. In un-tabulated results,
we explore this possibility and fail to find evidence of significant differences between the
average number of countries in which firms invest across property sector strategies.
27 See, for example, Feng et al. (2007), Boudry et al. (2010), and Harrison et al. (2011).
28 In model 1 the benchmark firm exhibits a 90.2 % probability of hiring an external advisor. If the firm’s
investment portfolio property weighted average contracting environment index increases by one
standard deviation, the probability of hiring an external advisor increases to 98.4 %
(0.902 + 0.082 = 0.984), a 9.1 % rise. Similarly, in model 4 the benchmark firm exhibits a 40.9 %
probability of external advisement. A one standard deviation improvement in the firm’s
contracting environment increases this probability to 88.8 % (0.409 + 0.479 = 0.888), a 117 %
increase.
29 The benchmark firm has a 90.2 % probability of hiring an external advisor. If the country risk of the
firm’s investment portfolio increases by one standard deviation, the probability of hiring an
external advisor falls to 22.9 % (0.902–0.673 = 0.229), a 74.6 % drop.
30 Specifically, Australian REITs may only participate in development activities for the purposes of
deriving rental income, Singapore REIT portfolios may invest a maximum of 10 % of their total
assets in uncompleted non-residential property and are prohibited from investing in vacant land,
while Hong Kong REITs are prohibited from participating in development activities or investing
in vacant land. For extended discussions of REIT regulatory differences across countries in the
Asia-Pacific region see Ooi et al. (2006), Luo (2008), Tan (2009), and Brounen and Koning
(2012).
31 We acknowledge that many, if not most, REITs and listed property companies will retain the
services of local appraisers to provide comprehensive market, site, and neighborhood analysis
before completing individual transactions. We view these one-off, pay-for-service deals as

materially different from firms which retain the ongoing services of, and publicly disclose the
identity of, a dedicated professional property appraisal advisory firm. We view these latter
service providers as roughly the equivalent of external advisors along the valuation dimension,
and throughout these robustness tests treat them accordingly.
32 We note this relationship, while robust across all four models in Panel A, is only statistically
significant at conventionally accepted levels in models 3 and 4 of Panel B. However, as our
empirical results in models 1 and 2 are extremely close to attaining statistical significance, and
in fact do so in alternative model specifications, we have also chosen to report associated pvalues for these two parameter estimates.
33 These results are not altogether surprising given both the superior econometric methodology and
the enhanced statistical power attributable to the increased number of sample observations in
Table #6.
34 Specifically, our expected return model is: Return = f (# of Countries, Pureplay, Analysts, Not-Rated,
Split, Income Focus, Stake & Inside, Institution, Market Cap, Debt Ratio, GAAP, Property Focus
Dummies, Country of Origin Dummies, Time Fixed Effects, ε). We lose three observations in
these models as we are unable to find performance data for these three REITs.
35 We note that these eight firms are evenly distributed across internally advised and externally
advised firms.
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Appendix 1 Asia-Pacific Real Estate Companies
AUSTRALIA

Sunlight Real Estate Investment Trust
(I)

First Real Estate Investment Trust
(E)

Swire Pacific Limited (X)

Fortune REIT (E)

Wharf (Holdings) Limited (I)

Frasers Centrepoint Trust (E)

JAPAN

Frasers Commercial Trust (E)

AEON Mall Co., Ltd. (I)

GuocoLand Limited (X)

Daibiru Corporation (I)

Ho Bee Investment Limited (X)

Daiwa Office Investment Corporation
(E)

Hotel Properties Limited (X)

Abacus Property Group (I)
Aspen Group (I)
Astro Japan Property Trust (I)
Australand Property Group (I)
Bunnings Warehouse Property
Trust (I)
Carindale Property Trust (E)
Centro Properties Group (I)
Centro Retail Group (I)

Keppel Land Limited (X)
Frontier Real Estate Investment Corp.
(E)
Fukuoka REIT Corporation (E)

K-REIT Asia (E)

Global One Real Estate Investment
Corp. (E)

Lippo-Mapletree Indonesia Retail
Trust (I)

Challenger Diversified Property
Group (E)

Hankyu REIT Inc. (E)

Mapletree Logistics Trust (E)

Charter Hall Group (I)

Heiwa Real Estate Co., Ltd. (I)

Overseas Union Enterprise Limited
(X)

Charter Hall Office REIT (I)

Industrial & Infrastructure Fund Inv. Co.
(E)
Parkway Life REIT (E)

CFS Retail Property Trust (I)

Charter Hall Retail REIT (I)
Invincible Investment Corporation (E)

Singapore Land Limited (X)

Japan Excellent, Inc. (E)

Stamford Land Corporation Limited
(X)

DEXUS Property Group (E)
EDT Retail Trust (I)
Japan Hotel and Resort, Inc. (E)
Starhill Global REIT (E)

FKP Property Group (I)
Japan Logistics Fund, Inc. (E)
Goodman Group (I)
GPT Group (I)
ING Industrial Fund (E)

JAPAN OFFICE Investment
Corporation (E)
Japan Prime Realty Investment Corp.
(E)

Japan Real Estate Investment
Lend Lease Corporation Limited (I) Corporation (E)

Stockland (I)
Sunland Group Limited (I)
Thakral Holdings Group (I)
Tishman Speyer Office Fund (I)
Valad Property Group (I)
Westfield Group (I)
HONG KONG

United Industrial Corporation
Limited (I)
UOL Group Limited (I)

ING Office Fund (E)

Mirvac Group (I)

Suntec Real Estate Investment
Trust (E)

Wheelock Properties (Singapore)
Limited (X)

Japan Rental Housing Investments Inc.
(E)
Wing Tai Holdings Limited (I)
Japan Retail Fund Investment
Corporation (E)

OTHER
Ackruti City Limited (I)

MID REIT, Inc. (E)
Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd. (E)
Mitsui Fudosan Company Limited (I)

Ansal Properties & Infrastructure
Limited (I)
Asia Standard International Group
Ltd (X)

Mori Hills REIT Investment Corporation
(E)
Asian Hotels (North) Limited (I)
MORI TRUST Sogo Reit, Incorporation Century City International Holdings
(E)
Ltd (I)

Champion Real Estate Investment
Trust (E)
Nippon Accommodations Fund Inc. (E) DLF Limited (I)
Cheung Kong Holdings Limited (X) Nippon Building Fund Incorporation (E) Far East Consortium International
Ltd (X)

China Overseas Land & Investment Nomura Real Estate Office Fund, Inc.
Ltd (X)
(E)

Ganesh Housing Corporation
Limited (I)

Chinese Estates Holdings Limited
(I)

NTT Urban Development Corporation
(I)

Goodman Property Trust (E)

Hang Lung Group Limited (X)

ORIX JREIT Inc. (E)

Hang Lung Properties Limited (X)

Premier Investment Corporation (E)

Harbour Centre Development
Limited (X)

Shoei Co., Ltd. (I)

Great Eagle Holdings Limited (X)
GuocoLeisure Limited (I)
HKR International Limited (X)

Sumitomo Realty & Development Co.
Henderson Land Development Co. Ltd. (I)
Ltd (X)
Tokyu Land Corporation (I)
Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels,
Limited (X)
Tokyu REIT, Inc. (E)

Hongkong Land Holdings Limited
(X)
Hotel Leelaventure Limited (I)
Housing Devel. & Infrastructure Ltd
(I)

Hopewell Holdings Limited (X)

Top REIT, Inc. (E)

Indiabulls Real Estate Limited (I)

Hysan Development Company
Limited (X)

United Urban Investment Corporation
(E)

Indian Hotels Company Limited (I)

Kerry Properties Limited (X)

SINGAPORE

Kowloon Development Company
Limited (X)

AIMS-AMP Capital Industrial REIT (E)

Lai Sun Development Company
Limited (I)
Link Real Estate Investment Trust
(E)
MTR Corporation Limited (I)

Kiwi Income Property Trust (E)

Allgreen Properties Limited (X)

Mahindra Lifespace Developers
Limited (I)
Mandarin Oriental International
Limited (I)

Ascendas India Trust (I)
Omaxe Limited (I)
Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust
(I)
Orbit Corporation Limited (I)
Ascott Residence Trust (E)

Paliburg Holdings Limited (I)

New World China Land Limited (X) Banyan Tree Holdings Limited (X)

Parsvnath Developers Limited (I)

New World Development Company
Cambridge Industrial Trust (E)
Ltd (X)

Peninsula Land Limited (I)

Pacific Century Premium Dvlpmnts
Ltd (X)

CapitaCommercial Trust (E)

Puravankara Projects Limited (I)

CapitaLand Limited (X)

Regal Hotels International Holdings
Ltd (I)

Prosperity Real Estate Investment
CapitaMall Trust (I)
Trust (E)
Regal Real Estate Investment Trust CapitaMalls Asia Limited (X)
(E)
CDL Hospitality Trusts (E)

Royal Orchid Hotels Limited (I)
Shangri-La Asia Limited (X)

Shenzhen Investment Limited (I)

City Developments Limited (I)

Sino Land Company Limited (X)

Sobha Developers Limited (I)
Unitech Limited (I)

Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited
(X)

The following table contains a list of all sample firms by country of incorporation. Information
identifying whether each firm is internally advised (I), externally advised (E), or internally
advised with a related professional property appraisal firm (X) is also included.
Appendix 2 Variable Definitions
Morck

Is the property weighted average of the Morck et al. (2000) governance index
-Higher values indicate a better contracting environment
Country
Is the property weighted average of the Country Risk Index published by Euromoney
stability
-Higher values of the index indicate a more stable environment
Civil law origin Is the percent of properties located in countries with a civil law based legal origin
Corruption
Is the property weighted average of the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency
International
-Higher values of the index indicate less perceived corruption
Disclosure
Is the property weighted average of the Global Competiveness Report
-Higher values indicate more/better disclosure
# of countries Is the number of countries in which the REIT or listed property company holds investment
properties
Pureplay
Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company invests exclusively
within a single country, and is set to 0 otherwise
Analysts
Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company has 1 year forward
looking estimates of funds from operations (FFO) available through either the First Call or FactSet
databases, and is set to 0 otherwise
Not-rated
Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company does not have rated
debt outstanding, and is set to 0 otherwise
Split
Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company has outstanding debt
rated by two or more rating agencies, with competing ratings that differ by at least one notch, and
is set to 0 otherwise
Income focus Is the ratio of total operating revenue to total assets
Stake & inside Is the SNL Financial reported stakeholder and insider ownership percentage
Institution
Is the SNL Financial reported institutional ownership percentage
Market cap
Is the REIT or listed property company’s reported market capitalization in U.S. dollars with
exchange rates based upon the record date for the firm’s financial statements
Debt ratio
Is the ratio of the REIT or listed property company’s total debt to its total assets
Development Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm has an active development plan, and is set to 0
otherwise
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